Attention to the issue of judicial dissenting is caused by growing popularity of this
Introduction
One of the main principles of the judiciary is the independence of judges. According to Article 120 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, judges shall be independent and submit only to the Constitution and the Federal Acts. Among the tools to provide the independence of judges, one can mention the institute of dissenting opinions -a possibility for the judge who has remained in the minority in the voting to add his/her individual voice to the institutional position of the majority. However, questions arise over the dissenting opinion. Does it endanger the unity of the court, undermine its authority, or does it democratize the judiciary, make it more transparent? Does it weaken the objectivity of the majority opinion, or does it strengthen its authority and credibility?
Although the right of Russian judges to dissent is deeply rooted, Russia generally disallowed publishing of dissenting opinions, principally because of their emphasis on collegiality in the dispensation of justice. Thus, the issue of dissension in the judiciary has largely escaped Russian academic attention. This issue has only seldom appeared in contemporary academic research (see Basangov, 2006; Kononov, 2006; Vereshchagin, 2007) .
After all, the introduction of dissenting opinions is a sign of how far thinking about the judiciary has changed in Russia over the past decade. It is a sign of the stability and effectiveness of judicial power, the independence of courts and judges.
Roots of the Dissenting Tradition
Roots of dissents can be found in common law countries. The British collegial common law courts decide seriatim (Latin: separately) -they present not only one judgment but make collective judgments. Each judge says in an order how he/she would decide the case at hand (Rupp, 1966, p. 532) . Such a style of decision making, as Laffranque (2003) writes, was adopted in the United States, but it was abandoned there at the end of the 18 th century (p. 164). The US courts formed a new tradition according to which judges who maintained a different opinion could add to the opinion of the court their dissenting opinion or concurring opinion, which was also published (Rupp, 1966, p. 532) . Rupp sees the roots of the dissents in the fact that Anglo-American judges are not "career judges" like judges in continental Europe who begin from the first instance in order to reach the highest court. The second reason of such popularity of dissenting opinions in the US and England is that the tradition of public debate belongs among the fundamental building blocks of the organization of state in the common law (legal) system (ibid., p. 535-536). In commonlaw countries, the court judgment is a result of public debate. In continental Europe, however, the decision of collegial courts is anonymous, and the secrecy of deliberations is not subject to disclosure. There is fear that the disclosure of the dissenting opinion may endanger the judge's independence (David, 1973, p. 134) .
Common law countries, in contrast, consider the disclosure of the judge's dissenting opinion to be the main criterion of the independence of a judge (Laffranque, 2003, p. 164 However, other persons cannot be informed about the dissenting opinion of a judge and its content.
So, in Russia, the institute of judicial dissents exists only within the context of constitutional judiciary.
Definition and Types

of Judicial Opinions
A judicial opinion is an opinion of a judge or a group of judges that accompanies and explains an order or ruling in a controversy before the court, laying out the rationale and legal principles the court relied on in reaching its decision. Its primary function is to challenge the arguments upon which the majority opinion is based. It presents arguments for interpreting a legal text in a different way than the majority of the Court interprets the legal text.
In Anglo-Saxon judiciary, there are two types of judicial opinions -concurring opinions (concurrences), and dissenting opinions (dissents). In brief, a concurrence is a written opinion by one or more judges, which agrees with the decision made by the majority, but states different reasons as the basis for the decision. A dissent is an opinion in a legal case written by one or more judges expressing disagreement with the majority opinion of the court which gives rise to its judgment. The dissent is different from the concurrence, which agrees with the Court's decision but provides an explanation that differs from the majority opinion. The dissent is more expressive and emotional.
The Russian legislation, for example, distinguishes between a "dissenting opinion" (osoboe mnenie) and an "opinion" (mnenie).
In the Constitutional Court Act of the Russian Federation (1991), the latter are called the "opinions concerning disagreement with the majority of judges" when a dissenter votes for the essence of the final decision but challenges the reasoning of the majority opinion. As a matter of fact, they are equivalent to the concurring opinions of common law courts. As I have noticed, concurring opinions are not popular among the judges of the Russian Constitutional Court.
Dissenting Opinions
vs. Majority Opinions
The specific character of the dissent, its individualistic tone, special purposes, and functions in legal setting are the traits differing from the majority opinion.
In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion is not a prescriptive document. In the dissent, the judge is allowed to position themselves as a subject of free will deliberately determining discourse. The judge expresses the opinion in a tone that is reflective of their personal view about the legal issue. The firstperson singular pronoun helps them to produce a phenomenological personalized statement.
Having the purpose to undermine the authority of the Court and its members as keepers of the Constitution, they attack their decision, challenge the validity of their reasoning and position, question their peers' legal expertise. They oppose their own views to the majority opinion, which they deem to be untrue and incorrect.
Let us look at the issue of tone in dissenting opinions in more detail.
Tone of Dissenting Opinions
In the judicial dissent, the judge is allowed to position themselves as a subject of free will deliberately determining discourse.
To step away from the dry theory, let me focus on one example. The example I would like to cite is the statement of Judge V. Luchin (Luchin, 1995) .
[The constitutional regime based on blood, people's grief, and trouble does not serve humans. The pyramid of basic constitutional values has been overturned. The Presidential Executive Order is not as harmless as it was presented by President's supporters. I believe he ordered to use armed forces to settle internal conflicts].
Luchin expresses his opinion in a tone
that is reflective of his personal view about the legal issue. In the above stated example, we see (Kononov, 1995) [ (Luchin, 1995) (6) Поддерживая решение большинства в целом, выражаю свое особо мнение. (Kononov, 1995) [Supporting the majority opinion in essence (I) express my personal opinion].
The rules of the synthetic Russian language admit omitting the pronoun I before the verb. There is another means of marking the authors of dissenting opinions -the pronoun "we".
The first-person personal pronoun "we" is able to express a wide variety of discourse functions.
In dissenting opinions, one can mention the functions as follows (according to frequency of occurrence): 1) to identify the judge as a person with the majority as an institutional body:
(7) Однако восстановление смысла и доказа-тельство очевидного далеко выходило бы за рамки нашей задачи. (Kononov, 2005) [However sense restoration and prima facie evidence were beyond the scope of our duty].
The first-person plural pronoun serves as a tool of positioning the speaker as a member of the Court, helps them to demonstrate a unity of interests, purposes and tasks. It is so called exclusive we which helps construct solidarity with the author's discourse community.
2) to identify the judge as an individual with the Russian nation or another community:
(8) Мы у грани, за которой народы России просто могут исчезнуть в столь масштабных братоубийственных конфликтах и войнах. И мы не знаем, с чем конкретно имеем дело, что это было -мятеж, война ли нечто выходящее за рамки и этих понятий. (Zorkin, 1995) [The danger of extermination of the Russian people in so large-scale fratricidal conflicts and wars is threatening us. We do not know what we are dealing with -whether it was a revolt, a war, or something beyond the scope of these concepts].
In the above example, мы [we] is a sign of identification with Russian citizens who are not able to properly assess the events in Chechnya. It is an inclusive we which can construct intimacy and involvement with the audience. Hyland says (2001) says that the writer can use inclusive we to "guide readers through an argument and towards a preferred interpretation of a phenomenon" (p. 560). The ultimate aim of the writer is, after all, to secure ratification for their claims (Gilbert 1977; Latour 1987) ; and so one of the writer's motivations for inserting the readers' anticipated objections, questions, or concerns into the discourse will be to enhance the persuasiveness of the text. The writer will be trying to get the readers to see things their way, and to accept their hypotheses (Harwood, 2005: 349) .
3) to identify the judge with humanity:
(9) Пройдет время, и мы поймем всю му-дрость фразы: 'Свобода печати обеспечивает свободу народа'. (Yaroslavtsev, 2003) [As years pass by, we shall see the wisdom of the statement: 'Freedom of the press ensures freedom of people'].
In the above example, we have a nonreferential, so-called generic мы -a general quantifier every S …., for all S…. which unites all people, all human beings.
Arguments for and against Dissenting Opinions
One of the arguments against dissenting opinions as a legal genre is that they, C.L Langford 1) The dissent is a guarantee of judicial independence. It guarantees the dignity to judges who remained in the minority and enables them to decide by their conscience, and not by the majority (Laffranque, 2003, p. 170) .
2) The dissent is a way to democratize the judicial system, a kind of a tuning fork of the judicial reform (Hadjiev, 1995) . Dissents have a democratizing effect on the Court via the possibility to deliver different opinions which are not in conformity with the majority opinion. D. Cole claims, the existence of conditions "for rhetorical struggle in the structure of judicial decision-making gives the dissent its influence" (Cole, 1986, p. 857) . The 'marketplace of ideas' belief holds that the truth arises out of the competition of various ideas in free, transparent public discourse. Different ideas and opinions are free to enter into the 'marketplace'.
3) The right for a dissent individualizes 4) The dissenting opinion provides alternative interpretations of the Constitution. It compromises "the authoritarian character of the law" (Posner, 1990, 461) . Dissent is considered "a healthy, and even necessary, practice that improves the way in which law is made" (Brennan, 1986, p. 134) .
5) The availability of dissents to the public makes the majority of judges better feel their responsibility for their decision.
6) The dissenting opinion 'ensures the effective functioning of the courts and promotes public debates, it opens a dialogue among the judges and legal scholars, between the commentators of court judgments and the legislators' (Laffranque, 2003, p. 164) .
7) The dissenting opinion creates the necessary prerequisites for scientific doctrines.
Dissenting opinions communicate legal theories to other justices, lawyers and politicians, and have sometimes turned into good law later on as a result of this.
Conclusion
The article has investigated the nature of the dissenting opinion, its main features and functions in judiciary from legal and linguistic points of view, arguments for and against this genre of legal writing.
The issue of the judicial dissent has been discussed for many decades and is still a debatable problem. Arguments are being suggested both for and against the dissenting opinion.
On the basis of the foregoing, it can be concluded that dissents fulfill the following functions: 1) they guarantee judge's independence, their freedom to speech; 2) they enhance judge's responsibility for decision-making; 3) they democratize the judiciary; 4) they serve as an alternative interpretation of the law; 5) they attract public attention to legal issues; 6) they influence lower courts decisions. 
